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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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Policy Research Working Paper 5611
This paper examines the current stage of development of 
government securities markets in the non-GCC MENA 
region focusing in five countries that have government 
bond markets with a minimum size and greater potential 
for market development: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco and Tunisia. The analysis focuses on the five key 
building blocks that normally sustain deep and liquid 
public debt markets: (i) money markets; (ii) primary 
market (issuance policy and placement mechanisms); 
(iii) secondary market organization; (iv) investor base; 
and (v) clearing and settlement infrastructure. The 
study shows that despite country differences, several 
common weaknesses in the key building blocks explain 
the underdevelopment of MENA bond markets. Most 
important among these are a symbiotic relationship 
between banks and Governments caused by lack of 
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alternative investments that makes banks act as captive 
demand and dominate bond markets, opportunistic 
primary issuance practices, and excess liquidity in the 
financial system. These demand and supply characteristics 
have led to highly concentrated buy-and-hold portfolios 
by banks and State-owned institutions, poor price 
discovery and lack of liquidity in secondary markets. A 
set of actions to unlock market development in MENA is 
proposed involving measures in all key building blocks—
from improvements in monetary policy implementation 
and liquidity management to enhancements in issuance 
practices, price transparency, and clearing & settlement 
infrastructure. Measures to improve the role of mutual 
funds and foster foreign investor presence are also of 
utmost importance to increase competition and investor 
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Deep and liquid government securities markets are critical for effective fiscal and 
monetary policies and are the cornerstone of financial market development. These 
markets support sustainable growth by ensuring stable government financing under 
different economic cycles and by broadening the scope of instruments and channels for 
the effective implementation of monetary policy. They also provide a benchmark and the 
institutional infrastructure for broader capital market development and management of 
financial risks, enhancing the resilience of the economy to adverse shocks.
1
The paper focuses on five countries in the non-GCC MENA region that have 
government bond markets with a minimum size and greater potential for market 
development: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia (MENA-5).  These 
countries have sizable debt-to-GDP ratios and domestic tradable debt and have, to 
different degrees, implemented measures to develop their local debt markets. They are all 
middle-income, oil-importing countries with diversified exports. These macroeconomic 
characteristics help explain their greater need to issue debt and rely on domestic debt 
markets. 
  Local 
currency bond markets have grown considerably in emerging market economies (EM), 
but remain relatively undeveloped in MENA. Consolidation of EM local currency debt as 
an asset class is widespread in other regions.  
MENA debt markets are less developed and underrepresented in global bond 
indices compared to other emerging regions. For example, the only MENA countries 
included in global EM local currency bond indices are Egypt (in J.P. Morgan’s GBI-EM 
and Markit’s GEMX) and Morocco (only in GEMX). Their weights are among the 
bottom quartile of all countries, and MENA accounts for only 2.1 percent of GEMX and 
0.2 percent of GBI-EM Broad Diversified. Inclusion in these indices requires minimum 
investability of a country’s debt market, which closely relates to key building blocks for 
market development. GEMX, for example, takes into account capital controls, taxes, 
secondary market liquidity, size of the investor base, quality of regulations and market 
infrastructure.
2
Overview of bottlenecks in public debt market building blocks 
  These criteria were applied to 33 EMEs including Egypt, Morocco, 





rd. Tunisia and Lebanon did not reach minimum scores for inclusion in the GEMX.   
Country differences notwithstanding, the underdevelopment and low representation 
of MENA markets are due to several common features in the five key building 
blocks that sustain deep and liquid public debt markets:  
                                                           
 
1 For more details see World Bank and IMF (2001): ”Developing Government Bond Markets: a Handbook” 
and Arvai and Heenan (2008): “A Framework for Developing Secondary Markets  for Government 
Securities.” IMF WP 08/174. 
2 For more details see Crisil (2009) “Gemloc Investability Indicators — Phase 2 extension.”  4 
 
•  Money markets are shallow as a result of the combined effect of (i) structural excess 
liquidity that is ineffectively sterilized; (ii) the choice of sterilization instruments by 
the Central Bank that are not supportive of market development; and (iii) poor money 
market operational arrangements. 
•  Primary markets provide an unbalanced choice of maturities favoring longer-term 
and illiquid securities, instead of a systematic approach to gradually lengthening the 
yield curve while supporting secondary market liquidity.   
•  Secondary markets are very shallow as a result of shortcomings in the issuance 
strategy, excess liquidity that promotes buy-and-hold investment, and bottlenecks in 
the institutional organization of the market.   
•  The investor base is not well diversified and mostly captive as a result of banks’ and 
state owned institutions’ dominance and excess liquidity. Institutional investors, such 
as mutual funds are often supported by regulatory, accounting and tax arbitrage that 
distort their role as competitive players in debt markets. Foreign investors, with the 
exception of Egypt, are almost non-existent, as they are being crowded out by local 
captive investors and discouraged, depending on the case, by low liquidity and poor 
market infrastructure. 
•  The clearing and settlement infrastructure is adequate for the current stage of market 
development, but would need significant upgrades to support more liquid and 
investable markets.  
Reforms in building blocks with most potential catalytic impact on MENA public debt 
markets 
Addressing the above weaknesses in key building blocks requires a carefully 
designed strategy for market development. The adverse dynamics of supply and 
demand of government debt in MENA have led to highly concentrated buy-and-hold 
portfolios by banks and State-owned institutions, poor price discovery and illiquid 
secondary markets. While the exact strategy needs to be country specific, it requires 
reforms of strong catalytic impact involving each market development building block.  
Money market reforms should focus on improvements in the operational framework 
for monetary policy and the development of repo markets. In an excess liquidity 
environment MENA Central Banks should provide incentives for banks for active 
liquidity management, thus creating conditions for well functioning money markets. 
These measures entail improved liquidity forecasting, the use of market-friendly 
intervention instruments and better coordination between Central Banks and Ministries of 
Finance to avoid, among others, price distortions in money market and other debt 
products. The development of a sound repo framework should also be a priority given its 
multiple benefits for money markets, primary dealers, market liquidity and the efficiency 
of monetary operations.  
The primary market, more specifically the issuance policy, is both the starting point 
for debt market development and the area in which most impact can be achieved in 5 
 
the short run in all MENA countries. Governments should consolidate short-term 
benchmarks to build credible long-term references in the future. They should also 
maintain a balanced maturity structure for outstanding debt, with regular and predictable 
supply of instruments at all key maturities in the yield curve. Auction rules and the partial 
use of syndications should be evaluated to enhance competition and price discovery. In 
countries with primary dealer systems (Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia) an effective set of 
performance-based incentives should be built. Finally, greater use of liability 
management operations (re-openings, buy-backs and switches) would accelerate the pace 
of market development by supporting benchmark building and the faster substitution of 
long-term debt issued at non-marketable conditions in the past.  
In secondary markets, enhancements in pre-trade and post-trade price 
dissemination would augment the impact of other building block reforms and 
support liquidity. Secondary market liquidity is a summary statistic that reflects 
bottlenecks in all key building blocks in MENA. Reforms in the different areas should be 
complemented by actions to improve price transparency, such as the collection of 
indicative prices or the implementation of standardized methods to collect and publish 
prices from market makers at a given time each day
3
In the area of investor base reform, revisions in the framework for mutual funds, 
policies to foster foreign investor participation, and the creation of hedging tools 
should be priorities for market development. Investor base reforms are by nature hard 
to tackle and take long to yield meaningful results. Mutual funds in Morocco, Tunisia and 
Egypt require a gradual but major overhaul so that they become a true source of investor 
diversification. Greater foreign investor participation would improve liquidity and be 
especially important for long-term securities, as banks have limits to hold and trade these 
instruments due to risks of duration mismatches. These risks could be mitigated by the 
creation of hedging tools, such as interest rate and foreign exchange swaps, which would 
support not only banks but also a broader set of market players, especially foreign 
investors. 
. Stricter reporting obligations of 
post-trade prices would also support price transparency and become increasingly 
important as these markets develop. 
Regarding clearing & settlement, a country specific vision should be developed to 
determine the type of infrastructure required. Only Morocco´s Central Securities 
Depositary (CSD) has the versatility required by wholesale and OTC government debt 
markets. All other countries need to formulate a framework and roadmap for a phased 
upgrade of their existing systems. An alternative option for some countries, such as 
Egypt, is to follow the same strategy as with the Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) 
system and develop a state-of-the-art CSD system. The rationale is the mutual 
dependency of both systems and the future need to have similar levels of IT and 
operational performance. 
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Stylized summary of bottlenecks and reform options for MENA public debt markets 
 
   
                                                           
 
4 In several countries mutual funds do not perform their expected function of disintermediating savings from the 
banking section.     
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1.  Introduction 
Deep and liquid government securities markets are critical for effective fiscal and 
monetary policies and are the cornerstone of financial market development. These 
markets support sustainable growth by ensuring stable government financing under 
different  economic cycles and broadening the scope of instruments and channels for 
effective implementation of monetary policy. They also provide a benchmark and the 
institutional infrastructure for broader capital market development and management of 
financial risks, enhancing the resilience of the economy to adverse shocks.
5
Local currency bond markets have grown considerably in emerging market 
economies (EM), but remain relatively undeveloped in MENA. EM local currency 
debt as an asset class has consolidated in other regions in several countries with distinct 
levels of income and market size (e.g. Mexico, Brazil, Poland, Turkey, Peru, Colombia, 
Indonesia and South Africa).  
 
This paper examines the current stage of development of government securities 
markets in non-GCC MENA countries, highlights key bottlenecks, and proposes 
reforms with strong catalytic impact to unlock market development. The analysis 
focuses on the five key building blocks that normally sustain deep and liquid public debt 
markets:  (i)  money markets; (ii) primary market (issuance policy and placement 
mechanisms); (iii) secondary market organization; (iv) investor base; and (v) clearing and 
settlement infrastructure. 
Our study shows that despite country differences, several common weaknesses in 
the key building blocks explain the underdevelopment of MENA bond markets. 
Most important among these are captive demand by banks that dominate bond markets, 
opportunistic primary issuance practices, and excess liquidity in the financial system. 
These demand and supply characteristics have led to highly concentrated buy-and-hold 
portfolios by banks and State-owned institutions, poor price discovery and lack of 
liquidity in secondary markets. Market development requires actions in all key building 
blocks  -  from improvements in monetary policy implementation and liquidity 
management to enhancements in issuance practices, price transparency, and clearing & 
settlement infrastructure. Measures to improve the role of mutual funds and foster foreign 
investor presence are also of utmost importance to increase competition and investor 
diversification in these markets.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of non-GCC MENA 
markets. It explains our criteria for country selection, presents a brief macroeconomic 
background, and illustrates the underrepresentation of these markets in global indices 
compared to other emerging regions. Section 3 presents a detailed assessment of the 
status  of each key government debt market building block across MENA countries. 
                                                           
 
5 For more details see World Bank and IMF (2001): ”Developing Government Bond Markets: a Handbook” 
and Arvai and Heenan (2008): “A Framework for Developing Secondary Markets for Government 
Securities.” IMF WP 08/174. 8 
 
Section 4 concludes with a proposed roadmap for reforms with strong catalytic impact for 
debt market development in MENA.  
2.  Overview of Government Debt Markets in the Non-GCC MENA Region 
2.1.  Selected MENA markets and macroeconomic conditions 
The paper focuses on five countries in the non-GCC MENA region that have 
government bond markets with minimum size and greater potential for market 
development: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia (MENA-5).
6  These 
countries have sizable debt-to-GDP ratios and domestic tradable debt (Figures 1 and 2) 
and have, to different degrees, implemented measures to develop their debt markets. 
They are all middle-income, oil-importing countries with diversified exports. These 










Other countries in the non-GCC MENA region have had, in general, fiscal and 
current account surpluses and have less developed debt markets (Figures 3 and 4).
8
                                                           
 
6 A separate background paper for the MENA Financial Sector Flagship study will cover debt markets in GCC 
countries. 
 
7 Although these macroeconomic characteristics make a clear case and explain the need for domestic debt markets, 
assessing the desirable share and trade-offs of cost and risk between domestic and external debt is out of the scope 
of this study.   
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Algeria’s domestic debt to GDP ratio is significantly lower than those of selected 
countries. Syria held its first government securities auction in December 2010. 
Marketable debt is negligible in Djibouti, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Yemen.  
Since 2005 the MENA-5 have reduced their public debt to GDP, primarily due to 
relatively high economic growth rates (Figure 1). The trend may be difficult to sustain 
in the current environment of lower global and regional growth, expenditure rigidities 
and, in some cases, the  implementation of stimulus packages (Egypt).
9
MENA-5 may be divided in three groups according to their debt vulnerability and 
credit ratings (Table 1):  
  Prospects of 
challenging debt dynamics make the need for reforms on domestic public debt markets 
even more pressing.  
•  The first group includes Morocco and Tunisia with the lowest level of public 
debt, at about 47 percent of GDP. They also have better fiscal, current account 
and inflation indicators and are both rated as investment grade. 
•  The second group comprises Jordan and Egypt with debt levels of 
approximately 65 percent and 73 percent to GDP at end-2009, respectively. 
Their comparatively higher debt levels, together with higher fiscal deficits (6.5 
percent and 7.8 percent of GDP at end-2009, respectively), make them more 
vulnerable than the first group. Credit ratings for these two countries are slightly 
below those of the first group. 
•  In  the third group, Lebanon has one of the highest debt levels among 
emerging markets (160 percent of GDP at end-2009). It also has higher public 
and current account deficits than the other countries in the region (10.6 percent 
and 10.5 percent of GDP, respectively, in 2009). Lebanon’s higher vulnerability is 
reflected in a weaker credit rating compared to the other four countries. In spite of 
a fragile combination of macroeconomic indicators, Lebanon has also followed 
the trend of its peers in the region by lowering the debt-to-GDP ratio by 20 
percentage points between 2006 and 2009. 
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Table 1: Country Groups by Debt Vulnerability 
 
 
Groups by Debt 
Vulnerability 
Countries  Debt to GDP*  
(as of Dec 2009) 
Credit Rating** 
(S&P and Moody’s) 
Group 1 
•  Lower Debt to GDP 
•  Higher ratings 
Morocco  47%  BBB & Ba1 
Tunisia  47%  BBB & Baa2 
Group 2 
•  Intermediate Debt to GDP 
•  Intermediate ratings 
Jordan  65%  BB & Ba2 
Egypt  73%  BB+ & Ba1 
Group 3 
•  Higher Debt to GDP 
•  Lower ratings 
Lebanon  160%  B & B2 
*Debt-to-GDP ratio with estimated 2009 GDP; ** Credit Ratings are as of June 2010 
 
All five countries have maintained stable exchange rates by following managed 
foreign exchange regimes, with different degrees of success at controlling inflation. 
The exchange regime has not prevented the five countries from implementing relatively 
independent monetary policies.
10
Improvements in fiscal policies and lower inflation volatility, especially in the more 
vulnerable economies, would provide better conditions for the development of debt 
markets. High debt-to-GDP and weak fiscal policies deter the implementation of market-
based debt management policy, and increase the temptation to rely on captive sources of 
demand to raise public debt. High and volatile inflation also pose a problem to 
consolidating the yield curve at lower interest rate levels. 
 Morocco and Tunisia have had the lowest inflation in 
the region. Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon experienced double-digit inflation in 2008, as a 
result of higher vulnerability to external shocks and looser fiscal policies. But these 
figures were already lower in 2009 both for Jordan and Lebanon, and are expected to 
come down in Egypt in 2010. 
                                                           
 
10  Boughrara and Ghazouani (2009). 11 
 
Key Macroeconomic Indicators for selected MENA countries 










2.2.  MENA public debt in emerging market indices 
A striking feature of MENA government debt markets is their low representation in 
indices, investment fund flows and even investment reports compared to other 
emerging regions. This reduced presence is revealed in some of the most common 




                                                           
 
11 The J. P. Morgan GBI-EM series include several variations of both diversified (with a cap of 10 percent 
on any country’s participation) and traditional market capitalization weighted versions. The GBI-EM Broad 
Diversified index is the dominant index accounting for over 70 percent of the US$ 80 billion in assets 
under management (AUM) benchmarked against the GBI_EM family (see J.P. Morgan, 2010) 
; (ii) statistics on investment flows from EM dedicated bond funds; and (iii) 
12  The Markit GEMX index includes sovereign local-currency denominated debt from EMs that meet 
minimum market size (US$ 3 billion) and investability critieria.  12 
 
the survey of the Trading Association for the Emerging Markets (EMTA) on secondary 
market transactions.  
MENA is underrepresented in indices such as the GBI-EM and the GEMX both in 
terms of number of countries and overall regional weights.  The only countries 
included are Egypt (both in GBI-EM and GEMX) and Morocco (only in GEMX) with 
weights in the bottom quartile of all countries represented. MENA accounts for only 2.1 
percent of GEMX and 0.2 percent of GBI-EM Broad Diversified (Figures 7 and 8). This 
is in sharp contrast with other regions that are much more widely represented (see Table 
2). 








The low representation of MENA countries signals that these markets are 
comparatively less investable than those in other emerging regions. Inclusion and 
weights in these indices are a function of the absolute size of the domestic debt (e.g.: in 
USD equivalent) and investability of a country’s debt market. However, size is not a 
good explanation for MENA’s low representation. Countries such as Costa Rica, Peru 
and Kenya with similar or smaller domestic debt size than MENA-5 belong to at least 







































one of the two indices. Moreover, Egypt has higher debt levels and much lower weight in 
both indices than countries such as Colombia, Hungary and Malaysia
13
Reforms in key market development building blocks are necessary to enhance 
investability and increase the participation of MENA countries in emerging market 
indices. While the exact criteria for the GBI-EM are not released, investability scores for 
34 countries with minimum public bond market size of US$ 3 billion are computed for 
eligibility to GEMX. The criteria takes into account capital controls, taxes, secondary 




MENA markets also fall significantly behind those of most other regions in terms of 
investments from EM dedicated bond funds (Figure 9). Taking a sample of 33 EMs 
from all regions and weighting flows with GDP,
 The four MENA countries in this sample, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and 




rd. Tunisia and 
Lebanon did not reach minimum scores for inclusion in the GEMX.   
15
                                                           
 
13 As of November 2009 domestic debt levels in (USD billions) were: (i) for MENA-5 – Egypt ($116), Lebanon 
($40), Morocco ($33), Jordan ($10) and Tunisia ($9). (ii) Costa Rica ($6), Kenya ($6), Peru ($11), Colombia ($49), 
Hungary ($36), Malaysia ($57). 
 we observe that bond fund allocations 
to MENA are much lower than those to LAC, ECA and SSA, the latter represented by 
Nigeria and South Africa. The low participation of non-resident investors in the region is 
a key characteristic of MENA’s investor base and is discussed in more detail in section 
3.5 below. 
14 For more details see Crisil (2009) “Gemloc Investability Indicators - Phase 2 extension.” 
15 We include 33 EMs with minimum bond market capitalization of US$ 3 billion. The countries are by 
region, East Asia Pacific (EAP): China , Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam; Europe and 
Central Asia (ECA): Croatia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Poland, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine; Latin 
America and Caribbean (LAC): Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, 
Venezuela; Middle East and North Africa (MNA): Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia; South Asia (SAR): 






MENA markets are also underrepresented in the “debt trading volume survey” 
released by EMTA (Figures 10 and 11). For example, Egypt ranks first in the region, 
but only 21
st  among all countries in volume of trades of local currency instruments 
reported by survey participants as of the fourth quarter of 2009. Next in the region is 
Lebanon (29
th). While the EMTA report serves only as an indication of market liquidity 









                                                           
 
16 EMTA Debt Trading Volume Survey reflects purchases and sales of assets in the secondary trading 
market based on instrument face value expressed in USD. Instruments denominated in local currency are 
converted to USD. In 4Q 2009, 47 companies participated in the survey. 15 
 
3.  PUBLIC DEBT MARKET BUILDING BLOCKS 
3.1.  Overview 
MENA-5 have been taking steps towards building a domestic debt market since the 
end of the 1990s with varying degrees of success. Most progress has taken place in 
issuance policy and primary market organization, with little improvements in other areas 
that are indispensible for debt market development. The result is a wide debt market 
development gap in relation to peer countries in other regions. 
This section will cover the current status and prospects in MENA of five key areas 
that normally sustain deep and liquid public debt markets. They include money 
markets; issuance policy and placement mechanism; secondary market organization; 
investor base and clearing and settlement infrastructure. In spite of country differences, 
there are several common features that are repeated in the organization of public debt 
markets in all MENA countries, which will guide the descriptions below: 
•  Money markets  are shallow as a result of (i) structural excess liquidity that is 
ineffectively sterilized; (ii) the choice of sterilization instruments by the Central Bank 
that are not supportive of market development; and (iii) poor money market 
operational arrangements. 
•  Primary markets provide an unbalanced choice of maturities favoring longer-term 
and illiquid securities, instead of a systematic approach to gradually lengthening the 
yield curve while supporting secondary market liquidity.   
•  Secondary markets are very shallow as a result of shortcomings in the issuance 
strategy, excess liquidity that promotes buy-and-hold investment, and bottlenecks in 
the institutional organization of the market.   
•  The investor base diversification is limited and mostly captive as a result of banks’ 
and state owned institutions’ dominance and excess liquidity. Institutional investors, 
such as mutual funds are often supported by regulatory, accounting and tax arbitrage 
that distort their role as competitive players in debt markets. Foreign investors, with 
the exception of Egypt, are almost non-existent, as they are being crowded out by 
local captive investors and discouraged, depending on the case, by low liquidity and 
poor market infrastructure. 
•  The clearing and settlement infrastructure is adequate for the current stage of market 
development, but it would need significant upgrades to support more liquid and 
investable markets.  
3.2.  Money markets 
In advanced economies, well-functioning money markets are the cornerstone of 
efficient domestic equity and debt markets. They serve multiple purposes of which the 
following five roles are of particular relevance to developing markets. 16 
 
•  They are the anchor price reference to all other financial instruments along the yield 
curve and across different risk classes. 
•  They provide financial intermediaries with instruments (e.g. repos, short-term 
derivatives) to manage risk and maturities in their balance sheet so that they can be 
reallocated according to the preferences and perceptions of different market 
participants. 
•  They enable intermediaries to finance their debt securities portfolios through repos. 
•  They are a key channel for the Central Bank to implement monetary policy through 
indirect, market-based instruments. 
•  They facilitate financial intermediaries’ hedging of forward positions in the foreign 
exchange market and are therefore instrumental to support liberalized foreign 
exchange regimes. 
Thus, the lack of efficient money markets is a major obstacle for the efficient price 
formation and resource allocation in domestic financial markets, as well as for providing 
tools to support macroeconomic and financial stability. 
Developing efficient money markets is still a major challenge in most emerging 
markets around the world given their links to complex structural and institutional 
reforms. They include the liberalization of the capital account and the development of 
foreign exchange markets; the ability of the Central Bank to improve its liquidity forecast 
(autonomous factors being a major difficulty
17
Money markets in MENA countries are shallow and most trades take place between 
banks and the Central Bank and not between banks.
) and to conduct timely and effective 
liquidity management operations; as well as the existence of a critical mass of sound and 
business-oriented financial intermediaries operating in the money market. 
18
i)  excess structural liquidity that is ineffectively sterilized;  
 This is the result of three 
interconnected factors:  
ii)  Central Banks’ sterilization instruments that are not supportive of market 
development and efficiency;  
iii)  poor money market operational arrangements.  
The preconditions for money markets to function properly are missing, depriving 
banks of the ability to actively manage liquidity. Hence they use more costly and less 
                                                           
 
17 Usually the net position of the government is the most volatile autonomous factor to predict. As this 
component is beyond the Central Bank’s control, this illustrates the importance of broader institutional 
coordination to build a more effective framework for liquidity forecasting. 
18 These features are well documented in FSAPs and specialized papers for individual countries in the 
region. See FSAPs for Tunisia (2006), Morocco (2008) and Egypt (2007); for Jordan in Vandenbussche, 
Blazsek, and Watt, (2009) 17 
 
efficient instruments to manage their balance sheet mismatches, such as precautionary 
funds in the form of excess reserves at the Central Bank and buy-and-hold investments in 
long-term debt. This worsens price formation across all the maturity spectrum of the yield 
curve. It is also the source of multiple inefficiencies in the other segments of debt 
markets, including the lack of secondary market trading and near captive demand for 
domestic debt because of lack of other investment alternatives.  
Relatively high reserve requirements, remunerated or unremunerated, are used in 
all MENA countries as a first recourse to absorb excess structural liquidity.  As it is 
widely acknowledged, the main drawback of this instrument is its cost on banks and the 
fact that it generally feeds into higher intermediation spreads. However, in the context of 
high sterilization needs it is a critical instrument that complements other tools such as 
auctioned bills or time deposits that are shorter term and bear a higher cost. Also, in the 
context of most MENA banking sectors, with low credit to deposit ratios, the opportunity 
cost of higher reserve requirements may be outweighed by the gains of more effective 
and less costly sterilization, and hence more efficient financial markets. For example, 
with higher reserve requirements the Central Bank would have to issue lower amounts of 
remunerated bills or time deposits or may even use repos to regulate liquidity. This would 
generally reduce interference with the Government’s issuance policy. Depending on the 
country, further analysis may be relevant to assess the benefits of higher reserve 
requirements for sterilization purposes.          
Excess structural liquidity is not sterilized fully and on a timely basis because of 
inaccurate forecasting of autonomous factors
19
The choice of sterilization instruments, aside from reserve requirements, mainly 
based on short-term auctioned deposits and overnight “standing facilities”, is 
inadequate to support effective liquidity draining therefore hinders market 
efficiency. These instruments are used in advanced economies for fine tuning operations 
or when forecasting errors are smaller
 
 and high costs related to the use of 
remunerated Central Bank debt or deposits. MENA-5 countries are in the process of 
improving their liquidity forecasting capacity with Morocco taking the lead followed by 
Egypt and Tunisia. However, this is a long process involving complex institutional 
changes across all Government spending units, as well as capacity building at Central 
Banks.      
20
                                                           
 
19 Government’s balances at the Central Bank and foreign exchange flows. 
. By using them to sterilize the bulk of structural 
excess liquidity, Central Banks in MENA countries face rolling over large volumes of 
liabilities in very short term maturities (e.g. seven day and overnight deposits, Table 3). 
This makes liquidity management more complex for both Central Banks and market 
participants and supports a“de facto” accommodative monetary policy. Morocco is an 
20 The choice of sterilization instruments should depend on the nature of excess liquidity to ensure effectiveness and 
minimum market disruptions: regular operations for changes in autonomous factors, fine tuning operations for 
unanticipated changes in forecasted liquidity, and standing facilities for the smaller forecasting errors after fine 
tuning operations (See in FSAP for Tunisia (2008) for further details on the operational framework for sterilization 
that applies to all MENA countries). 18 
 
exception among the MENA-5 being in liquidity shortage since 2007 as a result of a drop 
in foreign currency inflows related to the global crisis.
21
The large size of Central Bank liquidity draining operations in MENA-5
 However, higher accuracy in 
liquidity forecasting is still a pending issue in their reform agenda.      
22
Excess liquidity is a major stumbling block in MENA countries that needs to be 
addressed with policies and instruments that are more effective at draining liquidity 
and supportive of market development than the ones currently used. This is also a 
major challenge for many EMEs, but its impact is negatively reinforced in MENA by the 
flaws in the issuance policy and the investor base. In this context, there are some 
successful country cases in sterilization policies that could provide relevant guidelines for 
MENA countries. Brazil, Mexico and India, for example, have set up different 
arrangements to sterilize structural excess liquidity with government debt. Operational 
and accounting arrangements, as well as the distribution of costs between the Central 
Bank and the Government vary depending on the country
 
aggravates the problem of price formation in government debt markets. Two large 
issuers with equivalent credit risk compete for the same funds, thus segmenting the 
market. In addition, Central Banks not always behave as price takers in their sterilization 
operationswhich creates distortions in the short end of the yield curve for Government 
issues.  
23
The operational framework to support money market transactions is unevenly 
developed in MENA. An ad-hoc type of secured lending facility similar to a repurchase 
agreement is used by Central Banks in their infrequent liquidity injection operations. The 
interbank repo market, with the exception of Morocco, is almost inexistent. Aside from 
the lack  of incentives to manage liquidity actively, a number of regulatory, tax and 
infrastructure constraints impede its development. All countries, except for Lebanon, 
have sophisticated RTGS systems that include intraday liquidity facilities and online 
reporting of reserve balances. However, the Central Securities Depository (CSD) 
infrastructure to report and settle money market securities linked transactions such as 
repos or T-Bills, is underdeveloped in most countries and does not have the required 
money market functionalities. Only Egypt settles T-Bills on the same day as would be 
required in money market transactions, but it still requires enhanced automation and 
connectivity with the RTGS. 
. In the case of MENA, a 
stronger institutional coordination on both operational and budget arrangements would be 
needed between Central Banks and Ministries of Finance.  
                                                           
 
21 See Rapport de la dette intérieure, Financement du Trésor en 2008 (p.16). A widening commercial deficit 
and a substantial reduction of remittances and income from tourism are the main reasons. 
22 For example, in Egypt the Central Bank auctioned around LE 40 billion weekly in the first quarter of 2010. This 
was more than four times the Government´s weekly issuance of LE 9 billion, which in turn approximately equals the 
Central Bank overnight standing facility that amounts to around LE 10 billion on a daily basis. 
23 See Ho (2008). 19 
 
The implementation of sound repo frameworks in MENA countries should have a catalytic 
effect in buttressing other reforms, both structural and operational. Sound repo frameworks 
include legal agreement, clear tax and accounting rules, and settlement infrastructure. On the one 
hand, at early stages of secondary market development repos can support liquidity and maturity 
transformation even in illiquid markets. In these cases, as a second best, repo collateral may be 
valued at high discounts when market prices are scarce.  And on the other hand, efficiency in the 
repo market would be substantially improved by policies to build liquid benchmarks and by 
enhancing secondary market transparency so that reliable prices are available to value the 
collateral. In addition, upgrades in the settlement infrastructure to register and settle repos would 
improve efficiency in secondary market transactions. 
 
Table 3: Operational aspects of money markets 
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24 CBE negotiable bills discontinued in 2007 
25 CBJ negotiable bills discontinued in October 2008 
26 BdL 5-year negotiable CDs discontinued in July 2009 20 
 
3.3.  Primary markets 
A sound issuance policy is the first step in a strategy to develop a liquid domestic 
debt market. It entails regularity of issuance, a balanced maturity structure of debt from 
short to long term, sufficient size of issues maturing on a specific date, the choice of 
tradable and standard debt instruments, and the use of competitive placement 
mechanisms such as auction. In order to be sustainable, it also needs to match the goals of 
the issuer with the multiple business objectives of investors and market participants. The 
issuer should ideally be guided by an overall public debt management strategy that takes 
into account the government’s risk preferences considering trade-offs of risk, cost and 
market development priorities. Opportunistic decisions by the issuer would not only 
prevent debt markets from developing but would also impose a legacy burden that would 
make reforms more complex once market-oriented policies are taken on board 
MENA-5 countries have basic market-oriented issuance policies, including the 
correct choice of instruments,
27
i)  An unbalanced maturity structure that is skewed towards the long term and 
impedes building liquid benchmarks at all points of the yield curve. Hence, 
price formation is distorted in both primary and secondary markets.   
  but their pillars are unevenly developed and 
prioritize lowering funding costs over market development. In different degrees and 
depending on the country, key shortcomings are found in the following areas: 
ii)  Non-compliance with a predictable auction calendar and irregular supply at 
auctions of the whole range of debt maturities  with the exception of Egypt.  
iii)  Low degree of competition in auctions resulting from concentration of 
demand generally by State-owned institutions.  
iv)  Limited use of liability management techniques to consolidate issues, enhance 
liquidity and reduce rollover risk.          
 Instrument choice and debt structure 
The current debt term structure biased towards long maturities in most MENA 
countries coupled with illiquid secondary markets is one of the main obstacles to 
market development. In 2008, Treasury bonds accounted for 64 percent in Morocco, 61 
percent in Jordan, 98 percent in Tunisia and 94 percent in Lebanon (Table 4). Though 
extending the average debt maturity to reduce rollover risk is a legitimate objective, from 
a market development perspective longer maturities are only desirable as long as their 
issuance is sustainable and pricing is market based.  
Issuing long maturities too fast without price references at the shorter end of the 
yield curve creates uncertainty over the pricing of Treasury bonds. Issuers can only 
                                                           
 
27 Discount T-Bills for the short term and fixed coupon T-Bonds for the medium and long term.  Absence of 
inflation-indexed bonds in MENA is not surprising due, among others, to the lack of an institutional investor base 
(except in Morocco) for these instruments.  21 
 
develop a representative yield curve by providing regular volumes at all key tenors. The 
dynamics of sustainable maturity extension at market prices requires liquid prices at the 
previous tenor, so that new issues are priced with reference to the shorter maturity. 
Without short-term price references, Governments may be tempted to place their 
long-term debt at off-market prices. This is facilitated by captive demand linked to 
excess liquidity, dominant State-owned institutions and lack of alternative investments 
that distort pricing. While this strategy may lower the cost of debt in the short term and 
reduce rollover risk, it also works against the issuer by creating a vicious circle 
worsening market liquidity even further: 
•  There is a strong incentive for a buy-and-hold strategy since debt holders will 
avoid realizing latent capital losses this way. 
•  It weakens the balance sheet of financial intermediaries even if losses are not 
realized and increases liquidity risk in the financial sector, particularly in the 
event of a liquidity crunch. 
•  It unnecessarily segments debt into pools of locked-in debt portfolios delaying 
reforms to create liquidity at the shorter end of the yield curve even further. 
 
Shifting from long average debt maturities placed at off-market prices to market-
based maturity structures is a complex task entailing trade-offs in cost and roll-over 
risk. The specific debt and market structure, as well as stage of market development 
would determine a different approach for countries. Accordingly, MENA countries can 
be divided in three groups.     
Morocco and Tunisia have the longest debt structures with average maturity of 5.9 
and 5.3 years, respectively.  Secondary market liquidity in Treasury bonds is minimal in 
both countries, though Morocco compensates for lack of liquidity with an active repo 
market provides liquidity to bond holders
28
                                                           
 
28 The current role of repo markets in supplying liquidity in the context of an almost non-existent spot 
market does not seem sustainable in the long run. Repo collateral is currently priced at nominal value not 
reflecting market prices, and in the event of a liquidity crunch, lending parties in repo transaction would be 
exposed to substantial losses in the collateral they hold.    
. Low inflation, as well as captive demand 
related to excess liquidity, lack of alternative assets to invest and capital controls have 
supported longer term issuance in both countries. The high proportion of Treasury bonds 
issued with original maturities of 10 years and more (56 percent and 67 percent in 
Morocco and Tunisia, respectively) coupled with the lack of secondary market prices 
indicates captive demand. However, the lower rollover risk of outstanding debt in 22 
 
Morocco and Tunisia provides an opportunity to build the short end of the yield curve 
with large volumes of Treasury bills.
29
Average maturity is 1.75 and 2 years in Lebanon and Jordan, respectively. However, 
the share of short-term Treasury bills is too small (2 percent and 6 percent in Jordan and 
Lebanon) to build the short end of the yield curve, and the secondary market for Treasury 
bonds is non-existent.  The high level of debt, especially in Lebanon, poses severe 
refinancing risk. Therefore, any strategy to build liquid benchmarks that would 
temporarily reduce average maturity, should go hand in hand with complementary 
measures to counterbalance the increased rollover risk during the transition. Some 
countries have used for this purpose inflation-indexed, floating rate securities or local 
currency Eurobonds. 
  
Egypt is an exception within the region with average maturity of 1.5 years and 64 
percent of outstanding debt in Treasury bills.  This is in line with the expected 
structure given the low liquidity of Treasury bonds and reflects a more competitive 
environment. It is also a good example of how the constraint to issue long term securities 
is being used as an opportunity to build a yield curve. Since the beginning of 2009, 
Treasury bills are being issued according to a regular and preannounced calendar in 
combination with a similar strategy for Treasury bonds. 
Prudent macro policies to reduce the level of public debt can be undermined by 
wrong decisions on the structure of the debt and instrument choice. Extending the 
maturity at prices that have not been tested by the market delays debt market 
development, creates financial risk, distorts the role of government debt as a price 






                                                           
 
29 Morocco has radically changed the term structure of new issues since 2007, by stopping issuances of bonds with 
more than 5-year to maturity and by placing 60 percent and 95 percent of new debt in Treasury bills. This was a 
temporary strategy related to the impact of higher long-term yields on households, as housing loans in Morocco used 
to be indexed to the yield of Treasury bonds. This link in yields was eliminated in 2010 and issuance of long-term 
securities with 10 to 20-years to maturity resumed in the first semester of 2010, representing approximately 10% of 




Table 4: Structure of debt in MENA as of December 2008 
Source: Ministries of Finance and Central Banks (webpages) 
Table 5: Instruments issued by country with tenors and terminology as used 
locally 
  Egypt  Morocco  Tunisia  Jordan  Lebanon 



















































7-year (last in 
2003) 
n.a. 
Source: Ministries of Finance and Central Banks (webpages) 
Placement mechanisms 
Placement mechanisms, their frequency and operational procedures are critical in 
determining the level of transparency, competition and cost-effectiveness of issuing 
debt.  Although different selling mechanisms exist (e.g. auctions, syndication, tap sales, 
  Egypt  Morocco  Tunisia  Jordan  Lebanon 
Treasury bills  64 %  24 %  2 %  39 %  6 % 
Treasury bonds  36 %  76 %  98 %  61 %  94 % 









n.a.  58 percent in 10 
and 15-year bonds 
67 percent in 10 and 
12 years bonds 
Bulk in 1 to 5 
years 
82 percent in 
3-year bonds 24 
 
underwriting and private placements), auctions, sometimes combined with syndication, 
are typically the main sales technique used in domestic markets.  
Credible price discovery in MENA auctions is particularly important given illiquid 
secondary markets. Primary market prices are expected to be the reference until 
secondary markets develop. It is therefore of primary importance that the issuer behaves 
as a “price taker” and promotes good price discovery through regular and predictable 
issuance policies. 
All MENA countries have adopted a multiple price competitive auction model as the 
standard placement mechanism. Still, auctions generally lack key features to be truly 
competitive and supportive of market development. Three issues stand out in the 
assessment.  
First, issuance policy could be substantially improved in terms of transparency, 
predictability and regularity. Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia produce regular auction 
calendars, but the latter two do not always comply with the preannounced calendar
30
Jordan and Lebanon have a much lower degree of predictability and do not publish 
annual or quarterly calendars. They issue mainly T-Bills on a weekly or by-weekly 
basis and shorter term T-Bonds, but volumes are rarely predictable. This is caused in part 
by difficulties in cash flow forecasting by the debt office. 
. 
Morocco and Tunisia have less consistency and regularity in auction volumes and 
maturities. In the case of Morocco, the fact that the Government’s cash balances at the 
Central Bank were not remunerated led to closely matching the calendar of funding needs 
to the placement calendar. This reduced the opportunity cost of having idle cash but 
imposed the normal swings of the Government’s cash flow in the volumes allocated in 
auctions to investors. Recent changes introducing a remunerated account at the Central 
Bank and active cash management are expected to reduce volatility of volumes at the 
auctions. However, lack of consistency in placements may also be symptom of an 
opportunistic approach rather than a predictable policy to build market benchmarks. 
Egypt maintains higher regularity standards and high volumes at all relevant points of the 
yield curve after the recently published 2009 issuance plan that was further improved in 
2010.  
Second, competition in the auction is constrained by structural captive demand and 
concentration of the investor base in spite of efforts to enhance competition at the 
auction through primary dealer schemes. Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia have primary 
dealer schemes that have provided stable funding but not competitive price discovery. In 
Egypt, the fifteen appointed primary dealers have exclusive access to the auctions and to 
the T-Bond secondary market. Morocco has appointed six primary dealers with non-
exclusive access, and Tunisia has appointed one broker as primary dealer, but banks and 
other brokers may also participate in the auction. In Jordan all financial institutions, 
                                                           
 
30 Morocco has significantly improved regularity in 2008 by reducing the ratio of deserted auctions to 29 
percent from 49 percent in 2007.  25 
 
including NBFIs, may participate directly in the auction, provided they have a financial 
guarantee from a bank for settlement. In Lebanon, the placement system is based on 
auctions organized by Banque du Liban with banks as counterparts. 
Concentration in auction allocations is linked to the high participation of the public 
sector in all countries, be it through commercial financial institutions or the Central 
Bank. In Morocco, state-related institutions, Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion (CDG) and 
Hassan II Fund
31, have received  jointly in several occasions  more than 30 percent of the 
allocations
32, channeled through several primary dealers. In Tunisia, only 3 to 4 
participants receive allocations out of 7 to 8 bidding entities. Only Egypt has a cap of 30 
percent on the auction allocations for a single participant, but still State-owned banks 
receive around 40 percent of allocations. In the case of Jordan, the Central Bank may 
purchase securities in the auction. And in Lebanon, the Banque du Liban may also buy 
public debt, though after the auction. In the first half of 2009 the BdL was allocated 29 
percent and another19 percent went to public institutions
33
Improving competition in auctions requires major policy efforts related to the 
structure and degree of concentration in the financial sector. As the financial system 
diversifies competition is expected to strengthen. In the meantime, there are operational 
measures that could be considered to increase competition and price discovery such as 
establishing caps to the size of allocated bids, opening non-competitive auctions to large 
public sector funds or the combination of auction and syndication (book building process) 
to enhance control in the allocation of debt among different types of investors. In the case 
of Jordan and Lebanon, consideration should be given to assess the impact of the Central 
Bank buying large volumes of Government debt on the price discovery process and on 
sustainable funding following market principles.  
. 
Third, a stronger commitment to an active liability management strategy would be 
key to develop debt markets in MENA. The objective of liability management is to 
consolidate issues into a smaller number of issues with larger size at all key points of the 
yield curve, so that they can become liquid market benchmarks.    The liability 
management toolkit includes: 
•  Issue re-openings to place the same maturity date in different auctions. 
                                                           
 
31 CDG is a public financial institution created in 1959 with a mandate to contribute to economic and social 
development. It is one of the leading institutional investors with assets under management approximating 
MAD 65 billion in 2009 and investments in infrastructure, real estate and finance. Hassan II, established in 
2000, has a similar mandate and channels privatization proceeds into development of the infrastructure and 
industrial sectors. 
32 In 2008, Hassan II Fund after maturity of non-Government investments shifted temporarily its portfolio 
to public debt and received 24 percent of the allocations, and CDG as primary dealer received 14 percent. 
In 2009, Hassan II Fund was allocated 7 percent and CDG primary dealer 23 percent. 
33 The Central Bank of Lebanon (BdL) purchases MoF’s securities through a post- auction direct placement 
at the weighted average price established in the previous auction.   26 
 
•  Security buy-backs to pre-finance a particular issue shortly before maturity to reduce 
roll-over risk. Investors participating in buy backs are expected to reinvest in on-the-
run issues. 
•  Securitiy switches to replace older illiquid issues with new, more liquid on-the run 
issues. They can also be used to lower refinancing risk. 
Tunisia is using re-openings but without an explicit strategy to build benchmarks; 
while Morocco and Egypt have already incorporated systematic re-openings to build 
liquid benchmarks. In Morocco, despite the greater use of re-openings and increased 
size of individual lines of securities, there is still room to build larger benchmarks. In 
Egypt, the next step should be to utilize buy-backs and switches to smoothen the maturity 
profile of the larger issues and to support market liquidity by replacing less liquid issues 
with on-the-run issues. Tunisia should upgrade their re-opening practice by incorporating 
a strategy to gradually build benchmarks at all points of the yield curve. 
Jordan and Lebanon do not apply re-openings and have the most fragmented debt 
structure.  Consolidation of issues at the shorter end of the yield curve through a 
carefully designed re-opening strategy should be the first step, together with more 
predictable issuance calendars. The strategy should assess the adequate issue size that 
balances the need of larger volumes favoring market liquidity and re-financing risk. 
Consolidation of issues would be particularly important for Jordan given its lower debt 
volume in absolute terms and therefore a bigger challenge to boost liquidity. 
Additionally, the overfunding strategy suggested in the primary market section may also 
be more relevant to countries with a smaller size of domestic Government debt, as it 
would increase the size of investible debt. 
Table 6: Main features of primary markets 
  Egypt  Morocco  Tunisia  Jordan  Lebanon 
Placement mechanism  MPA  MPA  MPA  MPA  MPA 
Preannounced 
calendar 
Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Compliance with 
calendar 
High  Medium  Medium  n.a.  n.a. 
Re-openings  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Benchmark building 
dynamics 
Medium  Low  Low  Low  Low 
Bid-to-cover ratio in 
2008  
1.5  7  3  1.4  1.5 
Auction participation  15 exclusive 
Primary 
Dealers 













MPA: Multiple Price Auction 
Source: Ministries of Finance and Central Banks (annual reports and webpages) 27 
 
3.4.  Secondary markets 
Secondary markets are generally shallow in MENA-5 as a result of excess liquidity, 
inappropriate issuance policies, non-diversified investor base and inadequate 
market institutional organization.  Therefore, reforms in all building blocks mentioned 
in this report are pre-conditions for secondary market efficiency. The most critical aspect 
and, at the same time, relatively easy to be tackled by country authorities is the issuance 
policy as discussed in the previous section. The yield curve should be lengthened 
gradually through consolidation of benchmark maturities and in volumes large enough to 
support secondary market trading. In parallel, the institutional organization of secondary 
markets needs to be addressed.   
Secondary markets in MENA-5 may be classified into three different profiles:  
In the first group, Egypt shows the most active T-bill market and a gradually 
increasing trade volume in the T-Bond market, reflecting an improved issuance 
policy
34
In the second group, comprising Morocco and Tunisia, the combination of long-
term average maturity and scarce secondary market liquidity has led to a 
disproportionate and risky use of repos to manage liquidity that would otherwise be 
locked in long-term debt portfolios. In advanced economies, repo markets are in 
general larger than spot markets. Yet, the latter needs to reach a minimum volume 
threshold to ensure that the collateral is properly valued and that in the event of default it 
can be liquidated. In Morocco, the general repo legal framework work is robust, but the 
spot market to sustain credible valuation of the collateral is missing.   Repos account for 
99 percent of all trading activity, and report a 25 times turnover with average maturity of 
the debt at 5.9 years.  In Tunisia, with similar average maturity of debt at 5.3 years, the 
legal framework is weaker. Formal repos have not taken off, but a non-regulated 
substitute called ventes à rémérés is used instead by banks for liquidity management 
purposes. Trades are not formally reported. 
.  This is the result of a more systematic benchmark building strategy in the 
primary market through a predictable  and regular calendar of auctions covering all 
maturities. As a consequence, the maturity profile of the debt is more balanced, and it is 
easier to price issues by using recent auctions as reference.    
In the third group, Jordan and Lebanon have almost zero secondary market trading 
as a result of excess liquidity, a very fragmented debt structure, and poor market 
infrastructure.  
Trading venues and reporting obligations 
Government securities are predominantly traded in over-the-counter (OTC) 
wholesale markets and marginally on exchanges, and they are subject to trade 
                                                           
 
34 Reported figures for 2009 show a daily average of US$300 million in T-Bills and US$18-45 million in T-
Bonds. 28 
 
reporting obligations given their role as price references for other financial assets.  
The retail nature of exchanges is a constraint for the size and flexibility required by 
professional participants. Regulations of debt markets put emphasis on access, a 
minimum degree of transparency and systemic risk. Whereas exchange regulations focus 
on retail investor protection based on order driven systems, fixed settlement cycles and a 
high degree of transparency that would limit liquidity in wholesale debt markets
35
For historic reasons, trading venues for T-Bonds and T-Bills are often segregated 
between exchange and OTC markets, hence creating a dysfunctional secondary 
market architecture from the start. Egypt is the most extreme case with T-Bills being a 
traded OTC under the oversight of the Central Bank and T-Bonds being traded only on 
the exchange, In Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan, T-Bills and T-Bonds are traded OTC and, 
in parallel, T-Bonds may be also traded in the exchange. While this is not a problem at 
the moment, given the low reported volumes, it would be important to monitor any 
potential discrimination in the future against OTC trades in T-Bonds, since the clearing 
and settlement infrastructure is owned by exchanges. As OTC trades usually represent the 
bulk of transactions in most government bond markets, such discrimination would 
hamper the full potential of secondary markets. 
.  
Reporting obligations are very minimal in all markets as a result of the low 
secondary market activity, and there are no pre-trade price dissemination 
requirements in any MENA market. Several actions should be taken to improve pre- 
and post-trade price dissemination. In general, all closed trades should be reported to a 
designated authority (e.g. Central Bank, MoF), but when the market is very illiquid some 
proactive measures may be taken by either the MoF or the Central Bank. This may 
include the submission of indicative prices for  selected on-the-run issues, the 
implementation of standardized methods to collect and publish prices from market 
makers at a given time each day or, ultimately, the obligation to provide firm bid-ask 
quotes by primary dealers.  
Primary dealers 
Primary dealer programs have been very useful to ensure primary market 
placements and to supply liquidity in the secondary market.  Nevertheless, some 
advanced and emerging markets have developed efficiently without them. There is a 
broad range of different examples of obligations and rights that apply to primary dealers 
depending on the institutional structure and practices of each particular market. 
                                                           
 
35  For example, professional participants, such as markets makers may be discouraged by too much 
transparency to risk their capital in their trading activity, hence reducing liquidity. The trade-offs between 
liquidity and transparency has been discussed extensively in the literature of efficient bond markets. For a 
detailed discussion see Casey, Jean-Pierre and Lanoo, Karel: “Europe’s hidden capital markets”. CEPS, 
Brussels, 2005.  29 
 
The common feature of all three primary dealer systems in MENA (Egypt, Morocco 
and Tunisia)
36
A potential solution in MENA is to re-assess rules so that secondary market 
obligations are in line with the degree of market development.  This may include 
initiatives applied in other countries such as price fixing obligations or limited firm 
quoting obligations, together with a set of incentives that are performance based, such as 
the publication of league tables for marketing purposes, cash and securities lending 
facilities at preferential rates, exclusive access to post auction allocations.  Some of these 
measures are currently being assessed in Egypt. 
  is that only primary market obligations are enforced, while 
secondary market obligations are not.  This is in part explained by the structural 
difficulties to trading activity discussed in previous sections: excess liquidity, scarce or 
unreliable prices in the primary and secondary markets and poor benchmark building 
issuance policies, Therefore, it is unrealistic to enforce market making obligations as 
found in advanced markets. In this context, attempting to build an effective primary 
dealer system can be a source of frustration to both governments and primary dealers. An 
adequate set of rules and incentives need to be carefully designed and frequently 
reviewed according to different stages of market development. 
3.5.  Investor base 
An investor base for fixed-income securities, which is as large and diversified as 
possible, is important for ensuring high liquidity and stable demand in the market. 
A heterogeneous investor base with different time horizons, risk preferences, and trading 
motives ensures active trading and stimulates liquidity, enabling the government to 
execute its funding strategy under a wide range of market conditions. 
The institutional investor base is poorly and unevenly developed across MENA 
countries, with a concentration of public debt holdings in the banking sector. The 
following subsections describe briefly the current status of the investor base divided by 
banks, institutional investors (mutual funds, pension funds and insurance companies) and 
foreign investors. 
Banks as dominant investors 
Local banks are the largest domestic investor in EMEs’ sovereign debt. They held on 
average around 42 percent of total domestic debt in 2005
37
                                                           
 
36 Egypt´s program includes fifteen primary dealers that have exclusive access to the auction; in Morocco, 
the scheme comprises six primary dealers that do not have exclusive access but have as main incentive 
access to the non-competitive auction; and the model in Tunisia consists of a single primary dealer that is a 
broker and shares access to the auction with thirteen banks outside the primary dealer arrangement. 
, whereas in advanced 
economies they have a less dominant role with only 11 percent of public debt in that 
 
37 The most recent available data is from CGFS Paper No 28 “Financial stability and local currency bond 
markets”, Committee on the Global Financial System, June 2007. 30 
 
same year.  However, in most EMEs banks’ share is declining with the growing relevance 
of non-bank financial sector institutions (mutual funds, pension funds and insurance), 
which accounted for 38 percent in 2005.
38
In most MENA countries, banks together with public sector related institutions are 
more dominant buyers of domestic debt than in peer regions (Tables 7 and 8). In 
MENA-5, unlike many other EMEs, there is no evidence of a declining trend in the share 
of these entities in favor of institutional investors. Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon have the 
least diversified investor base with banks and the non-commercial public sector holding 
jointly above 75 percent of issued debt. Morocco and Tunisia are an exception, but only 
at first sight, with  banks holding only 22 percent and 33 percent of domestic debt, 
respectively, and no holdings by the non-commercial public sector. These figures are 
deceptive, as banks and NBFIs are the major investors in mutual funds in both countries 
to take advantage of different tax, accounting and liquidity arbitrage opportunities as will 
be explained later The risks and opportunities entailed by banks accessing the 
government securities market through mutual funds will be explained in the mutual fund 
subsection.        
 
The main drawback for debt market development is not the predominant role of 
banks as holders of public debt, but the circumstances that make them buy-and-
hold investors.  Under normal conditions, banks should trade their securities portfolio to 
support  their liquidity management operations. As explained above, excess liquidity, 
issuance policies not supportive of secondary market trading, and lack of alternative 
investments make banks buy-and-hold, reducing the potential liquidity and investor 
diversification in MENA public debt markets.  
   
                                                           
 
38 The participation of non-bank financial institutions has continued to grow since 2005. Despite the lack of 
aggregate data for their share in EMEs, increasing participation of holdings of non-bank financial 
institutions in countries such as Brazil, Mexico and Poland point in this direction. 31 
 
Table 7: Structure of investor base in MENA countries as a percent of total 
(as of December 2008) 
 
Source: Ministries of Finance and staff calculations. 
(1) State owned commercial banks are included (e.g. CDG in Morocco holding 9 percent of debt) 
(2) For Egypt, National Investment Bank of Egypt and Social Security; for Morocco CDG, for Tunisia and Lebanon 
the Central Bank. 
(3) Morocco: state-owned CDG manages 29 percent of industry's assets. 
(4) Tunisia: holdings by individuals 
(5) Jordan: available information only reports holdings of banks and non-banks. 
Table 8: Structure of investor base in selected Emerging Markets as a 
percent of total 
 
                       Source : Ministries of Finance and staff calculations 
                       Data for Brazil and Hungary, 2010. Data for Malaysia, Mexico and Costa Rica, 2009.  
(1)  For the case of Costa Rica and Malaysia Social Security funds are included. For Costa Rica, the 
state-owned insurance company holdings of public debt (3 percent) are included. 
 
Overview of non-bank financial institutions  
Non-bank financial institutions are underdeveloped in the MENA region, only Morocco 
stands out as an exception. Moroccan NBFIs account for 91 percent of GDP, compared with a 
Brazil  Hungary  Mexico  Malaysia  Costa Rica 
Banks  38  30  11  22  20 
Public sector (1)  0  0  45  50 
Insurance companies  4  0  9  0 
Pension funds  16  23  0 
Mutual funds   30  2  15  0 
Foreign investors  10  27  12  12  6 
Others  2  4  39  12  0 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
24 
37 
Egypt  Morocco  Tunisia  Jordan  
(5) 
Lebanon 
Banks (1)  55  23  33  81  62 
Public sector & pension funds (2)  30  27  1  36 
Insurance companies  3  12  0  0 
Mutual funds (3)  1  22  29  0 
Foreign investors  10  1  0  0  1 
Others (4)  1  15  37  0  1 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
19 32 
 
range of 10-15 percent in the rest of the region.
39
Mutual Funds 
 However, the structure of the sector poses a 
limit to competition and a truly diversified investor base. In Morocco, in 2008 NBFIs owned 60 
percent of  mutual funds’ assets, accounting for 23 percent of GDP. Thus, there is a partial double 
accounting in the final NBFIs figures. Additionally, the largest NBFIs are State-owned and there 
is a high concentration of assets. While Morocco’s large NBFI segment is a major achievement in 
terms of financial sector development, its structure limits the benefits of a diversified and 
competitive investor base.  
An active mutual fund industry provides an efficient channel of savings into debt markets. 
Mutual funds offer professional management and asset diversification with high liquidity and low 
cost.
40
Mutual funds are a competitive threat for banks’ liability base, therefore, there needs to be 
a strong business case (e.g. regulatory arbitrage, tax incentives, competition) for them to 
develop in financial systems dominated by banks. Country cases in both EMEs and advance 
economies provide examples of this process
  Positive spill-over effects to bond markets include enhanced demand for government 
securities and diversified trading and portfolio management strategies according to the 
specialized investment objective of each type of fund. 
41
Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia provide three different examples of a developing mutual fund 
industry, all of them bearing a wholesale profile tightly linked to banks. While all three 
mutual fund models are valuable developments and likely to be a seed to support a long-term 
mutual fund industry, there are also vulnerabilities to be addressed as explained in the next 
sections. A hypothesis to be tested is that mutual funds in these three markets may be playing the 
role of addressing some of the existing markets inefficiencies, specifically, lack of liquidity of 
public debt and thin money markets 
. Once mutual funds take off, even if it is with the 
wrong business triggers (e.g. regulatory arbitrages), they can become a very relevant player in 
debt market development if the right policies and regulations are applied. 
Morocco: mutual funds and regulatory arbitrages  
There are three key features of mutual funds in Morocco that help understand why 
they are so large in international comparison. First, financial institutions hold 74 
percent of mutual funds’ assets, indicating that they serve to bypass market inefficiencies 
or regulations.
42
                                                           
 
39 Source: November 2009 World Bank Development Policy Loan to Morocco. Real figures should be 
smaller as there is partial double accounting of assets, given that many contractual schemes and some banks 
invest in mutual funds. However, the importance of mutual funds is still well above it peers in the region. 
 Insurance companies and pension funds hold 50.5 percent of mutual 
40 See World Bank and IMF (2001), “Developing Government Bond Markets: a Handbook.” 
41 E.g., the development of money market funds in the US as a result of the caps on the remuneration of banks’ 
deposits in the 1970s, tax incentives in Brazil and Spain for investments in mutual funds, lower bank intermediation 
spreads vis-à-vis fund management fees in a number of European countries in the 1990s. 
42 As of end of 2008, mutual funds accounted for 23.5 percent of GDP, 75 percent of national savings and 
held 28 percent of public debt. NBFIs held 60 % of assets and  33 
 
funds assets, banks 13.7 percent and other financial entities 9.6 percent. The reasons 
behind this unusual structure: 
i)  Regulatory arbitrage. Different accounting regimes exist for profits and losses 
generated by proprietary trading versus mutual funds investments that favor the 
latter.  
ii)  Liquidity and yield higher than for other assets. Mutual funds are more liquid 
investments and provide higher return than investing directly in the money 
market. This is possible because most mutual funds invest in medium and long-
term debt, following the structure of the issuance policy and investment units can 
be redeemed immediately. Mutual funds thus disguise the low liquidity of 
government securities, and can develop into a risky scenario in the event of a 
liquidity crunch when all investors want to redeem their units at the same time.  
iii)  Professional management. Insurances companies and pension funds prefer to 
delegate asset management to mutual funds because they have better expertise.  
iv)  Low cost.   Mutual funds charge institutional investors low management fees 
which makes the outsourcing of asset management less expensive than building 
an internal team.  
Second, the mutual fund industry in Morocco is highly concentrated, and the largest 
entities are State-owned. In 2008, three mutual funds accounted for 68.1 percent of the 
industry´s assets, of which a subsidiary of the state-owned financial conglomerate CDG
43 
managed 28.6 percent of assets.  In addition, CDG’s parent
44
Third, mutual funds have become instrumental for liquidity management in the 
market by channeling banks’ and other NBFIs’ liquidity into the repo market. 
Mutual funds hold around 40 percent of the open positions of repos, which are mainly 
backed by medium and long term collateral (79 percent, of which 51 percent is long-term 
bonds). 
 accounted for 9.1 percent of 
GDP and held 9 percent of public debt.  
The current structure of the mutual fund industry in Morocco is not without risk 
but could be addressed through regulations and more proactive policies to develop a 
secondary market for government securities. The challenge is to reduce the role 
mutual funds are playing in intermediating financial sector liquidity and to increase their 
role in channeling savings in competition with the banking sector. Changes in regulations 
and reforms to improve money and secondary markets would enable financial 
intermediaries to manage liquidity directly under safer structures. In addition, the 
                                                           
 
43 Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion. 
44 This fund manages the assets of various institutions in the country, such as the National Social Security 
Fund and the National Savings Bank. 34 
 
availability of regular and relevant market prices would reduce the risk of mispricing 
portfolios or collateral held by mutual funds through repos. 
Egypt: money market mutual funds as product diversification 
In Egypt, only money market mutual funds have developed, but their extraordinary 
growth to LE 50 billion over a five year period (2003-2008) has been the result of 
arbitrage in the market. The trigger was the combination of high yield on the Central 
Bank’s overnight deposit facility, aiming to drain excess liquidity, and the strategy of the 
major banks to offer higher remunerated substitutes of cash deposits to corporations and 
high net worth individuals. As banks stated at that time, the higher Central Bank yields 
were “shared” with mutual fund clients.  
The current money market mutual fund business model in Egypt leads them to 
invest a large proportion of their assets in bank deposits and, hence their role in 
diversifying the investor base for public debt is negligible. According to April 2008 
figures, mutual funds could potentially buy 25 percent of outstanding public debt. With 
appropriate regulations money market mutual funds could shift a large proportion of their 
holdings from bank deposits into the Treasury bills and the repo market and become 
significant participants in the public debt market. 
Money market mutual funds could become the first step to develop a more 
diversified investor base including fixed income mutual funds. Recently some market 
participants have started to develop fixed income mutual funds after two regulatory 
changes that may be acting as triggers for the industry. The first one limits the average 
maturity of money market mutual funds from thirteen to six months. Thus, longer 
maturity funds should take the form of fixed income funds. The second regulation bans 
insurance companies from investing in banking products, including term deposits, thus 
fixed income mutual funds are currently seen as a substitute. 
Tunisia: banks and mutual funds 
Tunisia ranks first in terms of mutual funds holdings of public debt at around 28.6 
percent of outstanding debt despite having a very illiquid debt market. There are 32 
fixed income mutual funds with assets of around 7 percent of GDP. However, these 
figures are not reflective of an independent mutual fund industry since most funds are 
directly managed by banks. Public debt securities are bought by the funds through OTC 
transactions from the bank of the same financial group that participates in the auction
45
Tax and accounting arbitrage seems to be at the heart of the high share of mutual 
funds and their dependence of bank operations. For example, mutual funds pay only a 
. 
In addition, the bulk of government securities is long–term, and there are no reliable 
market prices to value public debt portfolios. 
                                                           
 
45 See further details in Republique Tunisienne: Strategie de Gestion de la Dette publique, Janvier 2004, 
Groupe Développement Economique et Social (MNSED),  Région Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord, 
Banque  Mondiale. 35 
 
20 percent withholding tax on the coupons of public debt, while if it is held directly, the 
corporate tax rate would be applicable. A high share of mutual funds in a context of low 
secondary market liquidity is a source of risk. However, it can also be an opportunity to 
build a more diversified investor base if accompanied by debt market policies improving 
mutual fund transparency and regulations, as well as a more balanced term structure of 
issued debt.   
Table 9: Structure of mutual fund industry in MENA as of December 2009 
(in US$ millions) 
 
Pension funds and insurance companies 
Pension funds and insurance companies typically play a major role in the 
development of government securities markets. These institutions help reduce the 
predominance of banks, alleviate the occurrence of one-way markets in volatile periods, 
and stimulate the demand for long-term instruments, especially during the accumulation 
phase of pension funds. 
Neither public nor private pension funds in MENA with the exception of Morocco, 
are playing a significant role in debt market development. Private pension fund 
reforms have been passed recently in Jordan and Egypt but they are not expected to 
change the investor base landscape in the short term. Their expected low growth can be 
attributed to the lack of incentives for potential contributors compared to public sector 
schemes and lack of assets limiting their investment options. As far as public pensions 
are concerned, they operate under pay-as-you go systems with pre-funded liabilities in 
Egypt, Morocco and Jordan, making their reserves a high proportion of GDP (33 percent, 
29 percent and 30 percent respectively).
46
                                                           
 
46 See details in the chapter on Pensions and Capital Markets in MENA of the Flagship report. 
 This ranks them as the largest institutional 
investors in each country. Yet, their public nature and lack of alternative investments 
place them in the position of captive investors with a limited role in creating competition 
Egypt  %  Morocco  %  Tunisia  %  Jordan  %  Lebanon  % 
Fixed income  31.00             0.35            11,705.00     53.45          2,555.00     88.44          -                 -              240.00          68.18         
Money market  7,869.00     90.09          6,685.00          30.53          -                  -              -                 -              -                 -             
Equity  492.00           5.63            2,667.00          12.18          235.00           8.13            -                 -              -                 -             
Hybrid  343.00           3.93            842.00             3.84            99.00             3.43            17.00             100.00        112.00          31.82         
Total  8,735.00     100.00        21,899.00     100.00        2,889.00     100.00        17.00             100.00        352.00          100.00       
Total as % of GDP  4.6  23.4  7.2  0.1  1 
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Fixed income  31.00             0.35            11,705.00     53.45          2,555.00     88.44          -                 -              240.00          68.18         
Money market  7,869.00     90.09          6,685.00          30.53          -                  -              -                 -              -                 -             
Equity  492.00           5.63            2,667.00          12.18          235.00           8.13            -                 -              -                 -             
Hybrid  343.00           3.93            842.00             3.84            99.00             3.43            17.00             100.00        112.00          31.82         
Total  8,735.00     100.00        21,899.00     100.00        2,889.00     100.00        17.00             100.00        352.00          100.00       
Total as % of GDP  4.6  23.4  7.2  0.1  1 36 
 
in debt markets. In Morocco, public pensions funds play a more active role in public debt 
markets, particularly Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion (CDG) holding 9 percent of public 
debt. It is the most important participant in the primary market and the second largest on 
the secondary market for government securities. This has raised concerns about its 
potential to influence public debt market prices. 
The contribution of the insurance sector to public debt markets is very limited with 
the exception of Morocco, due to the sector’s very small size across the region.   
Assets are mainly technical reserves for the property and casualty insurance business 
which are likely to be invested in very liquid instruments. Life insurance is 
underdeveloped in the region, and life insurance companies are not expected to make a 
major contribution to fixed income market development in the short run. Morocco’s 
insurance industry is the largest with assets amounting in 2008 to 17.3 percent of GDP, 
and holdings of 12 percent of public debt.  However, there is a high degree of 
concentration with the three largest companies holding about 50 percent of market share 
in terms of premiums collected.  
Foreign investors 
Foreign investors have been key agents to develop local currency government bond 
markets in many emerging market countries.  Country cases illustrating their 
importance can be found in Central and Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary and Czech 
Republic), Latin America (Brazil and Mexico), and South East Asia (Malaysia and 
Indonesia). Statistics measuring foreign investors´ exposure to public debt are not always 
available or accurate, and may differ depending on the source (e.g. Central Banks´ 
official registers, industry data). Comparisons across countries cannot always be 
straightforward given that in some countries investments may be indirect through 
structured off-shore derivatives
47
In general, in the most advanced EMEs foreign investors have supported the 
lengthening of the yield curve and financial innovations that are necessary to 
enhance financial sector depth. Since 2005, foreign investors have become a more 
stable source of funding in the medium and long-term domestic debt and they have been 
active secondary market traders.
 or that domestic investors may be registered as foreign 
holders. 
48
                                                           
 
47  For further details and debates on the impact of both direct and off-shore investments in domestic 
Government bond markets, see BIS CGFS Papers, No 28, “Financial stability and local currency bond 
markets”, June 2007 and Shanaka J. Peiris “Foreign Participation in Emerging Markets’ Local Currency 
Bond Markets” IMF April 2010.   
 They have also boosted competition, enhanced the 
quality of investment analysis, and were natural agents for market knowledge transfer 
between mature and emerging markets. In addition, they have been instrumental in the 
48 IMF, Chapter III of the April 2006 Global Financial Stability Report and Presentation by Mexico Debt 
Office at OECD/WB/IMF Tenth Bond Market Forum, April 29-30, 2008.  37 
 
development of foreign exchange and derivatives markets as instruments to fund or hedge 
their investments in local currency.
49
However, foreign investment in domestic public debt cannot be taken for granted, 
nor can its leverage effect on market development. Two aspects need to be taken into 
account: 
 
•  First, there are minimum preconditions that need to be in place. Aside from a 
stable macroeconomic environment, market access should be ensured: open capital 
account, a transparent foreign exchange and tax regime, no crowding out effect from 
local investors, and compliance with minimum custodial and settlement standards. 
Debt issuance also needs to follow minimum standards in terms of design, term 
structure and critical mass per benchmark, as well as some degree of liquidity. 
•  Second, generally there are fundamental reasons justifying expected one-off 
higher returns, such as expectations of currency appreciation or structural 
macroeconomic change. For example in Brazil and Mexico, foreign inflows were 
buttressed by currency appreciation expectations, higher yields and stronger 
macroeconomic fundamentals. In Eastern Europe, the expectation of joining the EU 
and the EMU has been a major driver for foreign capital inflows. 
Foreign investors´ presence in government debt markets in MENA is negligible. It is 
below one percent in Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Lebanon, with the exception of some 
foreign investment in Egypt at 10.5 percent in April 2010 almost entirely in Treasury 
bills (10.2 percent).  Two sets of factors may explain the current situation: 
First, MENA markets need to improve their investability. As discussed in Section 2, 
only Egypt and Morocco reach the minimum investability criteria relevant to foreign 
investors that make them eligible to be included in the GEMX index, and they score 
among the lowest EMEs.   
Second, excess liquidity in the banking sector in MENA-5 and the lack of alternative 
investments have crowded out a more diversified investor base, including foreign 
investors.  As explained earlier, with banks being a “de facto” captive demand it is 
difficult to assess the competitiveness of government debt auctions
50
Crowding-out of foreign investors due to a “de facto” captive demand by banks is 
even more severe for long-term securities in the context of fixed exchange rate 
. The fact that in all 
countries, with the exception of Egypt, the bulk of debt is very long term and very illiquid 
reinforces the captive demand characteristic. Even in the case of Egypt, foreign investors 
are hardly present in medium and long term debt, mainly due to the low liquidity of these 
securities which is not reflected in their yield. 
                                                           
 
49 See BIS CGFS Papers, No 28, “Financial stability and local currency bond markets”, June 2007. 
50 There are no regulations that force banks to invest in public debt, but the limited alternative investments make 
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regimes. Without expected gains from currency appreciation, absolute level of yields and 
liquidity become key decision factors for foreign investment in government securities. 
Captive demand adversely affects both factors (price and liquidity) and lead to flat yield 
curves that offer little incentive for foreign investment in the long-end of the curve. 
The current presence of foreign investors in Egypt reflects a combination of higher 
liquidity and attractive yields of T-bills, as well as improved debt management. The 
next challenge for Egypt would be to have foreign investors invest in longer tenors. The 
share of foreign investors in Treasury bonds has been minimal and constantly below 0.3 
percent, while their holdings of Treasury bills increased from two percent to more than 
10 percent between April 2009 and April 2010. Recent changes in the issuance policy 
aiming at building medium and long-term public debt benchmarks should have a positive 
impact on market liquidity, and can be expected to attract higher volumes of foreign 
investment to longer tenors. Improvements in incentives and obligations of primary 
dealers under consideration, including the enforcement of quoting obligations by dealers 
in electronic trading platforms may also lead to a more vibrant market that would 
encourage greater participation of foreign investors. 
All in all, the MENA-5 countries have been as resilient as their peer EMEs in 
weathering the crisis, which should help attracting foreign investment, but currently 
they are still of marginal interest to international investors. The main issue that needs 
to be addressed is related to the crowding out by banks and their captive demand status. 
Two types of policies would need to be explored to overcome this impediment. The first 
one is beyond the scope of this report and involves two areas of work: creating the right 
environment for banks to increase their  lending activity to the real sector instead of 
funding the Government, and implementing efficient procedures to absorb and manage 
excess liquidity. The second one entails the design of issuance policies and placement 
mechanisms that ensure competitive price discovery and consistent lengthening of the 
yield curve avoiding the use of captive demand. For this to happen, Governments need a 
stronger commitment to issue a balanced set of debt benchmarks at all key maturities and 
more competitive pricing mechanisms. Steps in this direction are being taken by Egypt 
and Morocco. 
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Table 10: Capital account and foreign exchange regime 
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USD 
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USD 
 
3.6.  Clearing and Settlement Infrastructure  
Efficient settlement infrastructure facilitates the smooth flow of transactions in the 
primary and secondary markets, strengthens investors’ confidence, stimulates the pace of 
market expansion, and limits exposure to systemic risk. 
 
All public debt securities in MENA-5 are issued in dematerialized form, and 
settlement takes place at central depositories through bookkeeping entry systems. 
Given that most trades are related to primary market services, the existing CSDs are 
adequate at the current stage of market development. Only basic functionalities related to 
primary market settlement, securities accounts reporting and reconciliation are required, 
which is what all systems are currently providing at reasonable levels of efficiency. 
However, as secondary markets volume increases, repo markets take-off and the 
Government starts conducting more sophisticated operations (e.g. liability management, 
securities lending), all CSDs will require substantial upgrades in services provided, 
automation, risk management on both the IT and operational level, and enhanced real- 
time connectivity with users (custodians, users) and services providers (e.g. payment 
systems, markets). 
The main shortcoming in clearing and settlement systems across the region is that 
they are lagging behind public debt market reforms. There is no clear vision for their 
role in the modernization of the financial system. Their role should include, among 
others, supporting Central Banks’ liquidity management operations and interbank money 
markets transactions; providing an efficient and risk-controlled framework for local and 
international investors; and offering equitable access to diverse market participants. In 
addition, there is an unusual disparity between the existence of state of the art RTGS 
systems in all countries, except Lebanon, and the substandard level of  securities 
settlement systems. RTGS systems will only be used to their full potential with active 
money markets supporting liquidity needs of real time money settlement, if efficient 
securities settlement systems support repos and T-Bill transactions. 
Clearing and settlement system need modernization in four priority areas (Morocco 
is an exception as it is well advanced in most of the required functionalities): 40 
 
•  Capabilities to process liability management transactions by debt management offices 
(see section 3.3). 
•  Flexibility in the settlement cycle so that the system can handle multiple settlement 
cycles that include T+0 for typical money market transactions (e.g. repos), as well as 
longer cycles for capital market transactions (T+1 onwards). 
•  Provision of basic repo functionalities so that both legs of a repo can be registered on 
the trade date, and the settlement of the second leg is automatic on due date. This 
functionality may be used for securities lending as well. 
•  Adequate risk management systems for non-delivery and non-payment so that second 
best risk management options such as pre-deposit of securities before trading can be 
avoided. The latter is currently used in Egypt for T-bonds and is a serious obstacle to 
secondary market trading, the rolling-over of repo open positions, and any market 
making program to be developed in the future that involves securities short-selling. 
The institutional set up of CSDs is very similar across the region with a relatively 
strong presence of the public sector in governance schemes. In all markets there is a 
single CSD for government and private securities. Egypt is the only exception with the 
CSD for T-Bills managed by the Central Bank and the CSD for T-Bonds and private 
securities controlled by the stock exchange. A single institution is a widely used model in 
other countries, particularly in medium to small markets, given economies of scale for the 
system itself and market participant back-office operations. The Egyptian model is 
unusual because public debt securities, while being a single asset class, are split between 
two different systems. However, if effort is made in connectivity arrangements between 
the two systems, as well as in standardizing settlement cycles and operational procedures, 
it would still be possible to function effectively with two systems. 
Best practices in the institutional set up involve Centrals Banks in the oversight of 
securities settlement systems. This includes establishing guidelines in the development 
of strategic functionalities for monetary policy operations and financial markets. Such a 
role is not explicitly acknowledged by Central Banks in any country in the region. 
However, in all systems there is a strong presence by the public sector either through a 
significant equity stake (e.g. 75 percent and 55 percent in Lebanon and Morocco, 
respectively) or through regulations that establish CSDs as public utilities (Tunisia, 
Jordan, Egypt). 
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Table 11: Institutional aspects of CSDs 
  Egypt  Morocco  Tunisia  Jordan  Lebanon 
Number of CSDs  Two CSDs   Single CSD  Single CSD  Single CSD  Single CSD 
Name of CSD  • CBE for T-
Bills 
• MCDR for 
T-Bonds 






Ownership  • Central Bank 
for T-Bills 
• Exchange for 
T-Bonds 
• State: 25 % 
• BAM: 20 % 
• CDG: 10 % 





• 7 banks 
22.58% 
















75 % owned 
by BdL 
 
Table 12: Operational aspects of CSDs 
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4.  ROADMAP OF REFORMS IN BUILDING BLOCKS  
Market development in MENA requires a carefully designed, country specific exit 
strategy addressing bottlenecks in areas of strong catalytic impact involving each 
market development building block. This section provides a roadmap comprising a set 
of policy decisions and recommendations to tackle these bottlenecks and unlock market 
development.   
4.1.  Money Market Reforms  
The operational framework of monetary policy should be designed to support 
money and debt market liquidity. Excess liquidity requires a more active role by 
Central Banks to ensure banks have the means and incentives for active liquidity 
management, ensuring well-functioning money markets.  
Central Banks need institutional changes and improved methodology to forecast 
autonomous liquidity factors more accurately, in addition to market friendly 
intervention instruments. This is a highly complex task that requires strong 
commitment from the Central Bank to develop the skills and dedicate the resources to 
forecast liquidity; to develop the adequate instruments; to conduct operations in a timely 
manner; and to coordinate with the Government to improve management of its cash 
balances. Even in Morocco, which is an exception in the region as it has had a liquidity 
shortage since 2007, intervention tools and coordination with the Government need to be 
refined to support more active trading in the money market. 
The Central Bank and the Government need to conduct their operations with 
minimal market interference and ensure that prices are not distorted. This is 
particularly important when the Central Bank needs to drain liquidity and therefore, to be 
an issuer as the Government. In this regard, the following are needed: (i) ensuring that 
large liquidity draining operations are not distorting the short end of the yield curve as 
may potentially happen in Egypt and Tunisia; (ii) discontinuing Central Bank 
participation in Government auctions such as in Jordan. 
The choice of instruments to conduct open market operations should take into 
account their impact on both the primary and the secondary government debt 
market. This should, enhance their efficiency as monetary operations tools, support the 
secondary market, and limit potential price distortions in the primary market of 
government debt. This recommendation applies to all MENA-5 countries, although the 
specific choices will be different depending on the nature of open market operations, 
market organization and degree of development. 
The development of a sound repo framework should be a priority given its multiple 
benefits for money markets, primary dealers, liquidity and the efficiency of 
monetary operations. Morocco has a sound repo framework since 2004 and a very 
active repo market. The rest of the countries have substitutes to repos with questionable 
legal and operational reliability. Solving the multiple aspects of repos (accounting, tax, 
legal contract, etc.) requires the leadership of a local institution, preferably the Central 
Bank. 43 
 
4.2.  Primary Market Reforms  
Issuance policy is both the starting point for debt market development and the area 
in which most impact can be achieved in the short term in all MENA countries. 
Regardless the degree of development in the countries covered, they all require a 
qualitative shift in their issuance policies.  
Governments should prioritize and aim at consolidating short-term benchmarks in 
order to build credible long-term references in the future This will affect mainly 
those countries that have favored risk reduction through longer debt maturities instead of 
debt market liquidity (Morocco, Tunisia). But it will also involve an effort by countries 
with shorter average maturities since they will need to conduct a systematic consolidation 
of issued debt in a smaller number of lines (Jordan and Lebanon). Egypt is already 
following a regular program aiming at consolidating short and medium-term references in 
the yield curve. 
A balanced maturity structure of outstanding debt should be maintained, at all 
times, with regular and predictable supply of instruments at key maturities, so that 
all points in the yield curve have liquid references. Once the yield curve has been 
lengthened following a gradual approach, Governments should maintain a regular 
issuance flow at all key maturities. Shorter maturities in T-Bills should be issued in 
sufficient volume so that investors can manage liquidity and do not bear all the interest 
rate risk. This is not in contradiction with attaining a long average maturity, but it does 
reduce the potential for maturity extension. This is a process that is already being 
implemented in Egypt, but will need to be included in reform plans in the other MENA 
countries. 
Auction rules and the implementation of other mechanisms such as syndications 
need to be examined on a case-by-case basis in an effort to enhance competition and 
ensure the best possible price discovery process. This is central to support policies 
aiming at building a yield curve and minimizing price distortions caused by captive 
demand. Enhanced competition should provide credibility to prices and at the same time 
help diversify the range of government debt holders.  
Reforms in the primary dealer model can contribute to improved competition in 
primary markets. In Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, where primary dealers exist, a 
thorough review of the rules for incentives and obligations would be required. Incentives 
could be dependent on performance evaluation as opposed to the current system where 
there are no special rewards to better performing primary dealers. For Jordan and 
Lebanon, these schemes would not be relevant until issuance policy becomes more 
regular and a benchmark building strategy is initiated. However, by linking primary 
dealer incentives to their performance in primary markets, competition is likely to 
increase and price discovery in primary markets to improve.   
Liability management operations (re-openings, buy-backs and switches) should be 
employed to support issuance policy aimed at benchmark building. Morocco and 
Tunisia are using re-openings but without an explicit strategy to build benchmarks, while 
Egypt is at a more advanced stage already incorporating systematic re-openings to build 44 
 
liquid benchmarks. The recent changes in Egypt are yielding results in terms of price 
discovery for government bonds, have shown reduced dispersion in bids at the auction 
and received positive feedback from market participants. Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt 
would benefit from well-designed buy-backs and switches to build a sound benchmark 
program. Jordan and Lebanon, with shorter term debt and at earlier stages of 
development could start by focusing on re-openings, but this should be accompanied by 
improved cash management, buy-backs and switches to manage refinancing risk.  
Different strategies such as the implementation of a debt exchange program should 
be assessed to address the impact of long-term debt issued at non-marketable 
conditions in the past. The existence of large debt portfolios under these conditions 
reduces the pace of debt market reforms in several ways. It segments the market by 
locking potential demand for new liquid debt until the old debt matures. This makes 
volumes of new liquid benchmarks smaller and therefore less liquid. The fact that newly 
issued debt will be valued at market prices may bring to light latent capital losses in 
portfolios holding the old debt. A major decision is whether to design a program to 
exchange all or only part of the old debt for the newly issued debt valued at market 
prices. The decision will depend on the size of the old debt, its maturity profile and the 
type of institutions holding it. The debt exchange would reduce vulnerability of holders 
because of increased liquidity of the new securities. In the event of capital losses, another 
option would be to classify these holdings as “held-to-maturity” and value them at 
amortized cost following current US GAAP rules
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4.3.  Secondary Market Reforms 
. 
Enhancements in pre-trade and post-trade price dissemination would augment the 
impact of other building block reforms and would support liquidity. As discussed in 
section 3.4, secondary market liquidity is a summary statistic that reflects bottlenecks in 
all key building blocks. Reforms in the different areas should be complemented by 
actions to improve price transparency, such as the collection of indicative prices or the 
implementation of standardized methods to collect and publish prices from market 
makers at a given time each day. Stricter reporting obligations of post-trade prices, 
despite the current low secondary market activity in MENA, would also support price 
transparency and become increasingly important as these markets develop. 
4.4.  Investor Base Reforms 
Mutual funds as have been developed in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt require a 
gradual but radical overhaul so that they become a true source of investor 
diversification.  The challenge is to transform mutual funds into reliable investment 
alternatives that channel savings into the securities market, including government debt. 
This is probably the most complex policy measure to implement because it depends on 
the success of other reforms in attaining liquid markets: issuance policy and money 
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markets. It would also challenge the dominant role of banks as main provider of saving 
products to the public. 
A thorough assessment is required to understand the ineffective role for market 
development played by mutual funds in each country and how latent risks can be 
untangled.  This would include how mutual funds are profiting either from market 
inefficiencies or from inadequate prudential regulations. Liquidity risks in mutual funds 
may have potential systemic implications. Lack of market prices and insufficient 
regulations may also lead to unfair treatment of customers because of a subjective 
element in the valuation of portfolios that may end by discrediting the figure
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Policies to increase foreign investor participation should be implemented to improve 
liquidity and develop government bond markets in the region. This is especially 
relevant for long-term securities as, in the context of a more market-oriented 
environment, banks would reduce their exposure to these instruments, due to duration 
mismatches with their short-term liabilities. The case for foreign investor participation is 
even stronger in the absence of a solid base of institutional investors in the region (except 
in Morocco). 
. In sum, if 
a solid industry is to be developed, details of the current business model of the existing 
industry need to be understood. Depending on the results and based on the quality of 
portfolios, trading flows with other market intermediaries, intra-group trades, degree of 
concentration of participants in the fund, an exit strategy into a more robust model may 
be required. This may include well-designed incentives to replace gains from current 
inefficiencies. Some countries have used tax incentives to support the growth of a retail 
based mutual fund industry. 
Primary and secondary market reforms that ensure competitive price discovery and 
consistent lengthening of the yield curve are critical to enhance foreign investor 
presence. The recommendations presented for primary and secondary markets improve 
investability of MENA markets and attract foreign investors. The implementation of 
predictable and regular issuance policies and the consolidation of price dissemination for 
key benchmark instruments are essential to enhance allocations of foreign investors in 
local markets through auctions or in the secondary markets.   
Developing hedging tools for interest rate and foreign exchange risk would facilitate 
greater foreign investor participation and support banks manage their duration 
mismatches.  These instruments allow broader investment strategies and more active 
liquidity management from foreign investors. Interest rate and foreign exchange swaps or 
other hedging tools are almost non-existent in all MENA countries. Their development is 
highly dependent on a more active local money market. 
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4.5.  Clearing & Settlement Infrastructure Reforms 
A country specific vision should be developed for clearing and settlement 
infrastructure. Only Morocco´s CSD has the versatility required by wholesale and OTC 
government debt markets. All other countries require formulating a roadmap for a phased 
upgrade of their existing systems. An alternative option for some countries, such as 
Egypt, would be to follow the same strategy as with the RTGS system and develop a 
state-of the-art system. The rationale is the mutual dependency of both systems and the 
future need to have similar levels of IT and operational performance. 





   
STRUCTURAL 
CONSTRAINTS 
High debt in buy-and-
hold portfolios 
Excess liquidity  Concentrated demand 




  Legacy issues: 
illiquid and 
uncertain valuation 
 Fixed exchange 
regime 




 Legacy of state owned 
banks 
 Inefficient credit 
markets 
 Captive demand 
CONSEQUENCES 
Shallow money markets 
Lack of competition in primary markets 
Opaque and thin secondary markets 





  Predictable and regular 
issuance 
  Consolidation of 
maturities for 
benchmarks 
  Balanced debt structure 
  Enhanced liquidity 
forecasting 
  Market friendly 
operations (effective, 
accurate and timely) 
  CB and MoF 
coordination 
 Competition in auctions 
 Revised framework for 
mutual funds 
 Foster foreign investor 
participation 
ACTIONS ON THE 
MICROSTRUCTURE 
  Liability management tools 
  Repo framework 
  Price collection and dissemination (fixing) 
  Hedging tools for interest rate and FX risks 
  Upgrade the C&S infrastructure 47 
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ANNEX 1: Lessons Learned for Syria, Algeria and Libya 
Syria, Algeria and Libya have relied less on debt markets to fund their debt. This is 
partially due to revenues from oil exports. However, these countries may consider 
developing domestic debt markets in the future to support monetary policy and financial 
sector development. The case for Syria is more urgent given its higher macroeconomic 
vulnerability with a fiscal deficit of 3.2 percent, public debt at 40.3 percent of GDP, a 
current account deficit of 4 percent, and lower oil reserves that it peers.
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Table 3: Main economic indicators for Algeria, Libya and Syria 
 
   
GDP 
 
Deficit/GDP  Debt/GDP  Ext 
 
CA/GDP 
Algeria  159.7  +11.4  7.2  2.7  +23.2 
Libya  100.1  +36.7  0.0  0.0  39.2 
Syria  54.8  -3.2  30.8  10.5  -4.0 
Source: IMF Regional Economic Outlook, Middle East and Central Asia, May 2009 
The three countries present similar structural constraints as their peers in the 
region: excess liquidity, lack of money markets, and concentrated banking sector 
dominated by State-owned banks, low loan-to-deposit ratios but high NPLs. With 
this profile, banks could be expected to invest heavily in public debt. Therefore, there 
would be a case for similar policies in efficient liquidity management for money market 
development and measures to limit the concentration of demand. 
The fact that no debt has been issued is a major advantage in relation to their peers 
in the regions for three reasons: 
•  There is no legacy of illiquid debt in the portfolios of banks to deal with. 
•  The lack of debt burden would enable these countries to start building the yield curve 
with short term issues without refinancing risk. 
•  They can deal with concentration of demand by putting a cap on maximum auction 
allocations because they don´t have funding constraints. 
A key challenge is to commit to a truly competitive primary market and not rely on 
captive demand. Prices in the auction would be the only source of market prices 
available for some time until secondary markets develop. Therefore, transparent price 
discovery in the primary market would preempt many of the current problems of 
opaquely valued debt portfolios in peer countries. 
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ANNEX 2: A Regional Debt Market Development Agenda? 
Structural constraints and the early stage of development of MENA local markets 
act as barriers to developing a realistic regional integration agenda in the short 
term.  Capital controls in some countries and the fact that countries have different 
currencies are additional obstacles. The constraints are even more critical in the absence 
of foreign exchange hedging tools. 
However, many of the debt market development constraints have common aspects 
across the region, and countries would benefit from the systematic exchange of 
experiences.  Establishing a regional forum for debt managers and central banks to 
exchange experiences and initiate discussion on potential common standards that could 
favor future integration may also have a catalytic role in each individual market. 
The standardization of information on instruments and practices on each local 
market and their dissemination would contribute to enhance the visibility of local 
markets across countries. This would serve two purposes. It would enhance visibility 
and transparency to international and regional investors, and it would facilitate peer 
country exchange of information on current practices and challenges, aiming at 
supporting regional integration in the future. 
Inclusion of MENA-5 in a bond index would  leverage the regional approach, 
provided it was complemented by some degree of coordination in reforms. Egypt and 
Morocco are already in GEMX which has implied higher visibility. The roadmap of 
reforms presented in this paper would help Tunisia, Jordan and Lebanon comply with the 
investability criteria and strengthen Egypt’s and Morocco’s participation in GEMX. 
Another option would be to build a stand-alone regional bond index, but this would not 
eliminate the need for reforms in these markets. For any index to be effective requires 
instruments and markets with minimum degree of investability.  
Regarding clearing and settlement systems, options could be explored to take 
advantage of jointly building a system to be implemented in various countries. The 
cost  and expertise needed to build such a system could be shared between various 
countries, while maintaining independence in the operation of the infrastructure. 
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ANNEX 3: Figures on Banks 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 